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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate whether French consumers have modified their pref-
erences towards environmentally-friendly vehicles between 2003 and 2008. We esti-
mate a model of demand for automobiles incorporating both consumers' heterogeneity
and CO2 emissions of the vehicles. Our results show that there has been a shift in
preferences towards low-emitting cars, with an average increase of 367 euros of the
willingness to pay for a reduction of 10 grams of carbon dioxide per kilometer. We
also stress a large heterogeneity in the evolution of preferences between consumers.
Rich and young people are more sensitive to environmental issues, and our results are
in line with votes for the green party at the presidential elections. We relate these
changes with two environmental policies that were introduced at these times, namely
the obligation of indicating energy labels by the end of 2005 and a feebate based on
CO2 emissions of new vehicles in 2008. Our results suggest that such policies have
been efficient tools to shift consumers utility towards environmentally-friendly goods,
the shift in preferences accounting for 20% of the overall decrease in average CO2
emissions of new cars on the period.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study how people reacted to two French environmental policies that aim at
mitigating automobiles carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. The first is the implementation,
at the end of 2005, of a European directive compelling manufacturers to indicate CO2
emissions for every car. The second is the introduction, in January 2008, of a green
taxation called the bonus/malus system (referred to as feebate hereafter), which provides
a financial reward for low CO2 emitting vehicles (less than 130 grams per kilometer) and
a penalty for the most polluting ones (more than 160 grams per kilometer).
More precisely, we investigate whether French consumers have modified their preferences
towards environmentally-friendly vehicles between 2003 and 2008. The first reason for this
interest is an environmental concern. In the last two decades, environment, and in partic-
ular global warming, has become a major issue. Policy initiatives are launched in many
countries to reduce the human contribution to greenhouse gas emissions, especially CO2.
Cutting vehicle emissions is a crucial objective, as the transportation sector accounts for
a third of the CO2 emissions in developed countries. In April 2010, 17 European countries
have implemented a taxation related to the average CO2 emissions of the vehicles.
1 The
California Clean Cars Law, introduced by the State of California and followed by 13 other
States, is another example. This program has the ambition to reduce overall greenhouse
gas emissions from passenger cars by 18% in 2020 and 27% in 2030.
However, it is unclear how this growing concern for global warming at the society level
translates at the individual one, both in terms of utilities and choices. First, global warming
is a very slow phenomenon that will impact consumers in the long run only. Second, it is
somehow immaterial and individuals may not know exactly what is their true individual
impact on it. Finally, even if it enters in the utility function of the consumers, environment
is a public good with a very large number of individuals contributing to it. Because of this
classic free riding problem, people may not modify their choices, even if global warming
and environmental issues are more and more discussed. At the end, we may thus wonder
if the evolutions observed at an aggregate level correspond to better information and a
true change in preferences, or just standard reactions to supply shocks stemming from
environmentally-friendly technical changes and to new incentives created by public policies.
The second reason to investigate the effect of these policies is related to the more general is-
sue of how consumers react to public policies. Beyond incentive effects, public policies may
affect social preferences, which in turn modify individual behaviors. A growing economic
literature, either based on theory, experiments or natural experiments, acknowledges the
importance of such effects (see, e.g., Bowles & Polanía-Reyes, 2012, for a recent survey).
Public policies may also modify the information set of bounded rational consumers, which,
in turn, may affect their choices. One goal of the paper is thus to investigate whether
1For recent analyzes of the environmental effect of such policies, see for instance D'Haultfoeuille et al.
(2013) and Huse & Lucinda (2013).
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such effects are at stake here, and, if so, to assess their importance with respect to more
standard price and supply-side effects.
To answer these questions, we use a dataset from the association of French automobile
manufacturers (CCFA) that records all registrations of new cars in France between 2003
and 2008, as well as some individual characteristics of the purchasers. Compared to most of
the existing literature that deals with the measure of environmental preferences, using such
data presents two main advantages. First, we observe true choices as opposed to stated
preferences, thus avoiding the so-called hypothetical bias (Arrow et al., 1993). Second, it
is instructive to see whether environmental concerns matter in carefully thought purchases
that represent a large share of consumers' budget. We investigate, through a structural
approach, how consumers' preferences for CO2 emissions and their willingness to pay to
reduce global warming have evolved over this period of time. We also study whether this
evolution is heterogeneous among consumers. We estimate a nested logit incorporating
observed heterogeneity through 18 demographic groups of consumers based on age, income
and urban area.
Our findings are the following. We observe that the introduction of both policies coincides
with a significant decrease of respectively 1.8 and 7.3 grams in the average CO2 emissions
of new vehicles, the average CO2 emissions being around 155 grams per kilometer in 2003.
An analysis of the market shares of each class of energy confirms these results. The market
share of cars emitting between 100 and 120 grams of CO2 per kilometer (class B), for
instance, increased from 19.9% in 2007 to 38.4% in 2008, following the introduction of the
feebate. Conversely, the market share of cars emitting between 160 and 200 grams of CO2
per kilometer (class E) has sharply decreased from 18.0% to 9.9%. Disentangling between
pure price effects of the feebate, changes in preferences of the consumers and other effects,2
we find a coincidence between the evolution of the consumers' utility and the timing of the
implementation of both policies. Our results thus suggest that environmental policies have
been efficient tools to shift consumers' utility towards environmental friendly goods. We
obtain that between 2003 and 2008, CO2 emissions have been reduced by more than 10%.
20% of this decrease are related to the evolution of consumers' preferences, 51% stem from
the price effect of the feebate while 29% account for supply-side and other effects.
We thus find evidence that consumers value environment and the reduction of global warm-
ing, and that their valuations has increased over time. This is true for all the consumers
we are considering, though we find a substantial heterogeneity in this evolution. It differs
in particular along age and income, the youngest and the richest being those who value
the most the environment. Between 2003 and 2008, young consumers increased their val-
uation of the reduction of global warming twice more than old ones, while rich consumers
increased their valuation around 1.5 times more than poor ones. In line with this interpre-
tation, we observe a positive correlation between the average evolution of the willingness
2Changes in preferences should be understood in a broad sense, including informational effects of the
policies.
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to pay at thex town level and the result of the green party candidate at the 2007 presi-
dential election. Finally, combining the estimates of environmental preferences with price
elasticities, the willingness to pay for a reduction of 10 grams of CO2 per kilometer raised
on average by 367 euros in 2008 compared to 2003-2006. These results are consistent with
Brownstone et al. (2000) and the results of the MIT Survey of Public Attitudes on Energy
and the Environment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the environmental policies , the evolu-
tion of average CO2 emissions on the period and potential explanations for this evolution.
Section 3 presents the demand model and the results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Environmental policies and evolution of CO2 emis-
sions
2.1 Energy labels and the feebate system
By the end of 2005, the European Commission compels manufacturers to place an energy
label on each new car. The French decree applying this European directive was published
in November 2005 and manufacturers were given six month, i.e. until May 2006, to conform
to it. The policy still applies today. The energy label indicates the precise average CO2
emissions of the vehicle and fuel consumption (in liter for 100 kilometers), its class of
emissions and the position of this class among all classes (see Figure 1). Seven classes are
defined, from A, corresponding to the lowest CO2 emitting cars (less than 100 grams per
kilometer), to G, the highest emitting ones (over 250 grams per kilometer). The goal of
this policy is to encourage consumers to buy greener cars by informing them about CO2
emissions. Thanks to these energy labels, consumers are aware of the impact of each car
on global warming. They may thus take it into account in their purchase decision, whereas
it was more difficult to do so before the policy. This informational aspect is reinforced by
the choice of the colors associated with the classes: from green for class A to red for class
G. These colors were deliberately chosen to influence consumers and signal them what a
good purchase for environment is.
4
Figure 1: A model of French energy label.
The second institutional change is the introduction, in January 2008, of a green taxation
called the bonus/malus system, referred to as feebate hereafter. This new policy was
announced on October 25, 2007. It was one of the main measures of an environmental
roundtable called the Grenelle de l'environnement that took place in France in 2007.
Its purpose, among others, was to lower average CO2 emissions stemming from cars from
176g to 130g of CO2 per kilometer in 2020, and the feebate was chosen as an incentive to
purchase environmentally-friendly new vehicles.
To this end, a financial rebate, from 200 and 1,000 euros, was given to consumers who buy
low CO2 emissions level vehicles (less than 130g/km), while consumers buying polluting
cars (more than 160g/km) were taxed, from 200 to 2,600 euros. The exact amount of the
rebate or the fee depended on the class of emissions the vehicle belongs to and the entire
scheme is presented in Table 1. These classes correspond to those of the energy label, in
which the subclasses C+, C-, E+ and E- were introduced.3 This feebate is received or
paid once, at the time of the sale of the vehicle. It applies to all new cars, including those
3We do not indicate in this table the class of emissions A+, which corresponds to emissions lower than
60g per kilometer. A rebate of 5000e was associated to this class, but in 2008 no vehicle belonging to
this class was sold in France. Note also that for the replacement of more than 15-year old vehicles by new
vehicles, the rebates were increased by an amount of 300 euros. This only represents a very small fraction
of the total amount of rebates (2.6%), and we neglect this measure hereafter as we do not observe which
purchaser received this extra rebate.
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purchased abroad. On the other hand, second-hand vehicles were not in the scope of the
policy.
Class of Emissions Feebate Percentage of
emissions (in g/km) 2007 prices
A (60-100] +1000e 8.1%
B (100-120] +700e 4.8%
C+ (120-130] +200e 1.2%
C- (130-140] 0e 0.0%
D (140-160] 0e 0.0%
E+ (160-165] -200e -0.98%
E- (165-200] -750e -3.2%
F (200-250] -1600e -4.3%
G > 250 -2600e -5.2%
Table 1: Details of the feebate
Contrary to the first policy, which only aims at modifying the information given to the
consumers, the feebate policy introduces financial incentives to encourage them to buy an
environmentally-friendly vehicle. These incentives are important in magnitude, the rebate
representing up to 8.1% of the list price on average for class A, and the penalty rising to
as much as 5.2% of the list price for class G.
2.2 Evolution of CO2 emissions
Before decomposing finely the effects, we provide a broad picture on the evolution of
average CO2 emissions of new cars in France. We rely for that purpose on a dataset
provided by the Association of French Automobile Manufacturers (CCFA, Comité des
Constructeurs Français d'Automobiles), which records all the registrations of new cars
bought by households from January 2003 to January 2009.4 Figure 2 displays the evolution
of average CO2 emissions of cars purchased on that period. Overall, there was an important
reduction of 13% (from 156 to 136 grams per kilometer) on average CO2 emissions of new
cars between January 2003 and January 2009. This reduction can be decomposed in three
parts. Between January 2003 and October 2005, before the introduction of the compulsory
energy label policy, average CO2 emissions dropped from 156g to 152g. This negative trend
indicates that there was already, before the policies, a tendency to reduce CO2 emissions.
Between the two policies, from November 2005 to October 2007, the decrease was slightly
more important, the CO2 emissions falling from 152 to 147. This is reinforced by the fact
4We exclude from this dataset exotic cars such as Rolls-Royces and Maseratis as well as commercial
models and vans like Renault Master, which respectively represent 0.09% and 0.21% of the purchases.
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that this decrease took place in a shorter period of time (24 months instead of 34). We
finally observe a large drop after the introduction of the feebate. In February 2008, CO2
emissions were equal to 138 grams and reached 136 grams in December 2008. The feebate
policy seems thus to have had a huge impact on CO2 emissions. We also see a peak in
the average emissions in December 2007, followed by a large drop. This is probably due to
anticipation effects. The policy was announced by the end of October 2007, so that some
households who planned to buy a high CO2 emitting vehicle were able to anticipate their
purchase in order to avoid the penalty.
130
135
140
145
150
155
160
01-2003 01-2004 01-2005 01-2006 01-2007 01-2008 01-2009
Average CO2 emissions
Linear trend (with breaks)
Compulsory 
energy labels
Feebate
Figure 2: Seasonally adjusted monthly average CO2 emissions of new cars.
To further analyze these patterns and measure the impact of the introduction of both
policies, we regress the CO2 emissions on three trends (corresponding to the three periods
previously described) and on two dummies indicating if each policy was active or not at
this time, controlling for monthly seasonal effects. The results are given in Table 2 and
represented in dashed lines in Figure 2. The econometric analysis confirms that the feebate
policy had a significant and negative impact on CO2 emissions but also indicates that the
introduction of compulsory energy labels negatively and significantly decreased the level
of emissions. Even if the effect of the first policy was smaller than the one of the feebate
(-1.81 versus -7.27 grams of CO2), it seems that both informational and financial incentives
are important to modify consumers' choices. We also see that not only the level but also
the trend in the decrease of CO2 emission have been affected and strengthened by both
policies.
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Parameters Estimate
Intercept 156.6∗∗
(0.370)
Time trend −0.083∗∗
(0.011)
Dummy of being after 11/2005 −1.81∗∗
(0.430)
Additional trend after 11/2005 −0.046†
(0.024)
Dummy of being after 01/2008 −7.27∗∗
(0.535)
Additional trend after 01/2008 −0.174∗
(0.069)
Nb of observations 71
Notes: monthly effects are included. December 2007 and Jan-
uary 2008 are dropped because of anticipation effects. Stan-
dard errors are heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation robust. Sig-
nificance levels: ∗∗ 1%, ∗ 5%, † 10%.
Table 2: Regression of CO2 emissions on time
Given that both policies are based on the classes of emissions of new cars, similar patterns
should be observed in the market shares of each class of emissions between 2003 and 2008.
We display their evolutions in Table 3. Overall, the results are in line with the effects
depicted in Figure 2. The market shares of low-emitting classes increase sharply during
the period, while those of high-emitting classes fall drastically. Considering for instance
class B, we observe in 2006 a first jump from 13.2% to approximately 18.7% in its market
shares, and then an even larger increase, from around 20% to 38.4%, in 2008. Conversely,
considering class E-, we observe in 2006 a first fall from around 17% to approximately
15.2% in its market shares, and then an even larger decrease, from 15.1% to 7.8%, in 2008.
This is confirmed by the econometric analysis on classes B and E (see Figure 6 and Table
18 in Appendix B).
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Class of Market shares Evolution
emissions 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2003-2008
A 0.03% 0.02% 0.01% 0% 0.02% 0.06% 100%
B 13.58% 13.22% 13.17% 18.72% 19.89% 38.40% 188%
C+ 2.61% 5.20% 10.60% 12.35% 10.33% 9.53% 264%
C- 17.48% 18.55% 14.84% 15.63% 19.74% 18.57% 12%
D 36.04% 34.16% 32.66% 28.77% 26.93% 21.67% -38%
E+ 4.76% 5.45% 5.31% 3.38% 2.90% 2.04% -55%
E- 18.88% 16.48% 17.04% 15.20% 15.10% 7.82% -60%
F 4.80% 5.16% 4.98% 4.63% 3.66% 1.38% -73%
G 1.82% 1.76% 1.39% 1.30% 1.44% 0.54% -73%
Notes: market shares exclude the outside option (i.e., not to buy any car) and thus sum
to one here.
Table 3: Evolution of market shares according to the emissions class
Finally, we study the evolution of average CO2 emissions according to some demographic
characteristics. This is possible since the French new cars registrations dataset provides
information on the car but also on its owner. We observe the age and the city in which
the owner lives. Based on these characteristics, we created 18 groups of individuals based
on their age classes (18-39, 40-59 or 60 and more), geographical areas (cities of less than
20,000 inhabitants, called rural areas or more, called urban areas) and imputed income
classes (0-22,000, 22,000-32,000 or more than 32,000). Details on the income imputation
and market definitions are provided in Appendix A.1. These three variables were chosen
because they turn out to have a large effect on purchases (see Table 13 in Appendix A.1).
The evolution of average CO2 emissions according to the type of area, age and income
are displayed in Table 4. The table emphasizes consumers' heterogeneity in the purchase
of new cars. Young people, low-income people, and people living in rural areas tend to
buy lower CO2 emitting cars. Nevertheless, the evolution of CO2 emissions supports our
previous findings and is rather the same for all groups of consumers. In particular, each
policy implies a significant decrease in the CO2 emissions, with, as expected, a larger effect
for the feebate.
9
Demographics 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Evolution
Age ∈ [18-39] 149.3 148.4 147.4 144.1 143.7 133.8 -10.4%
Age ∈ [40-59] 156.0 155.1 154.2 150.7 150.3 138.6 -11.2%
Age ∈ [60-100] 155.1 153.8 152.7 149.3 148.4 138.4 -10.8%
Income < 22,000e 150.9 149.5 148.3 144.6 143.6 133.9 -11.3%
Income ∈ [22,000-32,000] 154.0 153.0 151.8 148.3 147.6 136.9 -11.1%
Income > 32,000e 157.9 156.8 155.5 151.6 150.8 139.2 -11.8%
Rural area 152.7 151.7 150.9 147.6 147.2 136.9 -10.3%
Urban area 154.7 153.7 152.7 149.3 148.5 137.6 -11.1%
Table 4: Evolution of average CO2 emissions according to demographic characteristics
2.3 Potential explanations
The evolution of average CO2 emissions may be due to several factors that we now examine
in details.
2.3.1 Price effects
The more natural explanation of the sharp decrease in CO2 emissions in 2008 is a price
effect due to the feebate system. What is peculiar is that the amounts of fees and rebates
are relatively low compared to their effect. For instance, a rebate of 700e given to class
B vehicles represents, on average, a 4.8% reduction of price (see Table 1), but implies an
increase by almost 100% of the market share of this class. Similarly, the decrease of 50%
in the market share of class E- would be due to a 750e penalty, or a 3.2% raise of their
prices. Because manufacturers adjusted their prices in reaction to this policy change, these
percentage are actually upper bounds of the true changes in prices. Overall, it thus seems
difficult to rationalize such variations of sales with usual price reactions solely.
These important variations may however stem from threshold effects induced by the fee-
bate. If many consumers choosing class C+ vehicles before 2008 were nearly indifferent
between them and class B vehicles, they could massively switch to class B following the
introduction of the feebate. The extent of this effect can only be assessed through a mi-
croeconomic demand model taking into account heterogeneity both of cars' attributes and
consumers' preferences. We develop and estimate such a model in the following sections
to assess precisely the importance of the price effect.
2.3.2 Supply side effects
The evolution of CO2 emissions may also be due to supply side effects, such as technical
changes or new incentives to market low-emitting vehicles, because of a fuel price increase
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for instance. The sharp fall in 2008 could also be due to an immediate adjustment of the
supply side. To assess the importance of these effects, we study how the set of vehicles
offered by manufacturers evolved through time. Because we do not observe directly this
set of vehicles, through brand lists for instance, we assume that a product is proposed to
consumers at a given month if it is bought at least once before this month and after this
month, or at least once during this month. We then compute average CO2 emissions of
the set of cars offered at each date, for all brands and French brands only. The results are
depicted in Figure 3.
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Notes: each month, average is taken over all ``supplied'' vehicles, namely vehicles sold
once before and after the month, without weighting by their sales. Our construction of
``supplied'' vehicles imply that at the beginning or end of the period, only vehicles with
enough sales are included. These vehicles tend to have lower CO2 emissions. To avoid
such boundary effects, we drop the first and last six months.
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Figure 3: Average emissions of supplied vehicles
Overall, there has been a reduction of around 5.5% of the average CO2 emissions of supplied
cars on the period. This decrease is very regular over time and approximately identical for
French and other manufacturers. Beyond technical change effects, this could partly be due
to the fuel price increase over this period. The gasoline price increases on average by 6.3%
per year, well above the average inflation in France over this period (2.2%). Long term
objectives such as Voluntary Agreements may have also played a role. Since the end of
the 90's, automobile manufacturers committed to reducing the level of CO2 for passenger
cars in the European Union, the latest target being an average of 130 g/km for 2015.
Finally, the observed decrease may be a reaction to an increasing trend in preferences for
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low-emitting cars, leading manufacturers to develop their product line in favor of small
and fuel efficient vehicles.
On the other hand, it seems that there is no immediate change in the products offered in
response to both policies. This may seem surprising, especially for the feebate, given the
sharp changes observed in market shares of the different classes of emissions. However,
there are several reasons for not observing an immediate adjustment of the supply side.
First, the manufacturers incentives may not be that large, because in January 2008, the
feebate policy was conducted in France only. Although taxes related to CO2 emissions of
vehicles exist in most other European countries, they do not display similar discontinuities
at the emission classes level. The advantage of exploiting these thresholds for the French
market only may thus not overcome the costs of developing specific models, especially for
non French manufacturers.5 Second, the feebate policy was announced only two months
before its application, and the very quick implementation of the reform contrasts sharply
with the time needed by manufacturers to improve fuel efficiency. It is usually thought
to take several years to develop new technologies and incorporate them in new vehicles.
Berry et al. (1993), for instance, observed a two-year shift between the increase in the fuel
price following the first oil crisis and the corresponding technical innovations. Similarly,
we do not observe any particular acceleration or changes between 2003 and 2008 in the
number of patents on domains related with CO2 emissions. Finally, even if horsepower,
and thus CO2 emissions, can be adjusted quickly, the modified vehicle must be certified
before appearing on the market. This certification, together with the distribution of the
new vehicles, typically takes several months.
2.3.3 Macroeconomic effects
It is well documented that the automobile industry is sensitive to macroeconomic shocks
(see, e.g., Bar-Ilan & Blinder, 1992, Hassler, 2001). Even microeconomic studies put
forward the importance of aggregate shocks (see, e.g., Goldberg, 1995). Negative economic
conditions may lead people to buy smaller, low-emitting cars. It seems unlikely, however,
that the drop in January 2008 stems from such an effect. Figure 4 shows that the economic
distress mainly appears at the fourth quarter of 2008. Similarly, the unemployment was
at a historically low level in January 2008 (7.5%), and the sharp increase (from 8.1%
to 9%) only occurs by the fourth quarter of 2008. Thus, consumers' economic situation
seems very unlikely to explain the pattern of CO2 evolution. Yet, we do take into account
possible wealth effects hereafter by stratifying our demand model along income classes and
introducing year dummies to capture some of these effects.
Fuel price is also known to be an important determinant of automobile choices (see, e.g.,
Berry et al., 1993). The increase after 2005 may be responsible for the change in the trend
of average CO2 emissions that we document before. It is very unlikely to explain the drop
5Note also that within countries tax systems evolve rapidly. The feebate cutoffs, for instance, were
modified in 2010 and in 2011. This further limits the incentive to adapt the products line.
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at the beginning of 2008, on the other hand, as the fuel price increase started at the end
of 2006. Nonetheless, we take into account this evolution by including kilometers per euro
in the attributes of the vehicles when estimating our demand model.
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Figure 4: Quarterly GDP Growth
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Figure 5: Gasoline Prices evolution
2.3.4 Temporary effects
Another possibility is that the large fall that occurred in 2008 may be due to temporary
effects. First, consumers may anticipate the feebate to be temporary, and thus take advan-
tage of the rebates quickly after the introduction. This kind of reactions would however
be completely at odds with the government announcement. The feebate was supposed to
be permanent, with only a decrease of the cutoffs by 5g every year from 2010, to induce
technical progress. In practice, a change in the rebate amounts did occur in 2010, from
1,000, 700 and 200 euros for classes A, B and C+ to respectively 700, 500 and 0 euros.
However, it seems unlikely that a rush in small cars purchase in 2008 could be due to the
anticipation of this cut in the rebates. We would rather expect such a rush to occur by
the end of 2009.
Second, price changes may imply a decrease in the optimal lifetime of smaller cars and an
increase in the optimal lifetime of bigger ones. In this case, some individuals with small
cars find it optimal to replace their car at the beginning of the period, while individuals
with bigger cars postpone their replacement (see, e.g., Adda & Cooper, 2000, for evidence
of such effects). If this effect was large, the fall in average CO2 emissions should be quickly
followed by a rise in these emissions. We do not observe such a rise in 2008. On the contrary,
the trend in the decrease of CO2 emissions is significantly higher after the beginning of
2008. Similarly, the market share of class B increases more quickly after this point. Even
though we do not have monthly data in 2009, Table 5 shows, using aggregate data also
from the CCFA, that this evolution continues in 2009.6 The market share of class A was
multiplied by three between 2008 and 2009, while the one of class B increased by 36%.
On the opposite, the market shares of classes E+ and G decreased by around 50%. Even
6For the sake of comparison, the 2008 figures include car fleets and some exotic cars that are excluded
otherwise from our analysis. This explains why the market shares by classes differ from Table 3.
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though other phenomena are probably at stake in 2009,7 these evolutions suggest that the
sharp changes following the introduction of the feebate were not temporary.
Class Market shares Evolution
of emission 2008 2009 of shares
A 0.08% 0.29% +259%
B 35.18% 47.8% +35.9%
C+ 9.46% 7.99% -15.6%
C- 18.56% 17.1% -7.8%
D 22.71% 17.94% -21.0%
E+ 2.01% 1.07% -47,0%
E- 8.98% 5.97% -33.6%
F 2.27% 1.51% -33.6%
G 0.74% 0.34% -54.5%
Sources: 2008: detailed dataset on registra-
tions of new cars (CCFA). 2009: aggregated
data on registrations of new cars (CCFA).
Table 5: Market shares according to the class of emission after 2008 (aggregated data)
2.3.5 Changes in consumers' information and preferences
Finally, additional non-price effects may be at stake. It is documented that people value
environment per se, and are thus ready to pay for environmentally-friendly goods (on
automobiles, see, e.g., Brownstone et al., 2000, or Potoglou & Kanaroglou, 2007). It seems
plausible then that environmental policies shape and reinforce these preferences. Such
changes in preferences would explain both drops at the end of 2005 and at the beginning
of 2008.
These policies may have modified the information set of consumers, by putting forward the
CO2 emissions levels of automobiles. The information being easier to incorporate in their
choices, consumers may have taken it more easily into account. In the model developed
by Gabaix (2012), consumers face too much characteristics and only select part of them
to make their choices. If policies reduce the cost of gathering information about CO2
emissions, consumers will rely more on this characteristic when purchasing a car.
The feebate could also modify people's preferences through the informational content of
the policy (see, e.g. Barigozzi & Villeneuve, 2006). Basically, the tax could be seen as a
7This year corresponds indeed to the peak of the economic crisis. The government also introduced a
scrapping subsidy of 1,000 euros for more than 10-year-old cars that were replaced by vehicles emitting
less than 160g/km.
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credible signal that environmental issues really matter, in a world where consumers may
have trouble to make up their mind about the negative impact of CO2 emissions. The
introduction by the state of a tax, or a feebate as here, is a way to convince consumers
that CO2 emissions constitute a first order problem.
Though we do not model this hereafter, the change in preferences may also be reinforced
by peer effects. If people tend to conform to others in their purchasing decisions (see
e.g. Bollinger & Gillingham, 2012, for such evidence), and anticipate that environmental
policies will induce a shift towards environmentally-friendly cars, this shift will be reinforced
through a social multiplier.
All these effects will be captured in our model by a change in the valuations for CO2
emissions. With a slight abuse of language, we will refer to them as changes in consumers'
preferences, keeping in mind that they could also be informational or peer effects.
3 Distinguishing the effects
3.1 The demand model
To disentangle between the explanations detailed above, we rely hereafter on a structural
demand model, using the CCFA registration dataset. CO2 emissions, the brand, model,
type of fuel, number of doors, type of car-body, horsepower, weight and cylinder capacity
are reported for each registration. These characteristics have been complemented with list
prices8 and fuel prices, allowing us to compute the number of kilometers per euro. We
estimate a nested logit with observed heterogeneity, taking advantage of the availability
of consumers' characteristics in our database. In other words, we estimate structural
parameters that are group-specific. This amounts to supposing that among each of the 18
groups of individuals defined by their age class, income class and type of area, preferences
are homogenous.
Formally, we suppose that each year, consumers can choose to buy one of the J different
products proposed on the market. To avoid the aforementioned anticipation and post-
anticipation effects of 2007 and 2008, the year we consider actually excludes January and
December. We define a product by its brand, model, car-body style, type of fuel, CO2
emissions class and number of doors. As usually in the literature, we consider the charac-
teristics of the base version of the car model, which is considered to be the cheapest one.
Product 0 corresponds to the outside option, namely not purchasing a new car during the
year. The automobile market is supposed to be segmented according to the main use of the
car and we have created several nests accordingly.9 The utility of consumer i, belonging
8Transaction prices (including potential discounts by distributors) would be preferred, but are not
available, as usually in this literature (see, e.g. Berry et al. (1995)).
9Our segmentation is close to the one of the European New Car Assessment Program (Euro NCAP),
see Appendix A.3 for details. For more details on the construction of products, see also Appendix A.2.
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to the demographic group d, for purchasing car j at year t is then given by
Udijt = pjtβ
d +Xjtγ
d + fdt (CO2jt) + ξ
d
jt + εijt.
pjt denotes the price of vehicle j at t. Xjt denotes other standard attributes: weight,
horsepower, number of kilometers per euro (computed using the average price of fuel each
year), engine capacity, number of doors and car-body style. Xjt also includes time and
model fixed effects, to control for macroeconomic shocks and unobserved heterogeneity of
products, respectively. Thanks in particular to the introduction of the feebate, we still have
sufficient variations within models, in particular in prices, to allow for such fixed effects.
To capture potential time-varying environmental concerns of the consumers, we also include
CO2 emissions through the term f
d
t (CO2jt), where we consider several specifications for f
d
t
hereafter. CO2jt is not collinear with the number of kilometers per euro because first, this
cost varies with the fuel type and second, gasoline and diesel prices differ.10 Its specific
effect can therefore be identified. If the environmental policies affects consumers utility, we
should observe a change in the impact of CO2 emissions in 2006, 2007 and 2008 compared
to the previous years, all other things being equal. As explained above, the interpretation of
the term fdt (CO2jt) is complex. It may capture both a negative valuation of CO2 emissions
per se and an information effect, people becoming more aware of the true CO2 emissions
of the cars and its impact on pollution level.
ξdjt and εijt correspond to variables that are unobserved by the econometrician. ξ
d
jt rep-
resents the mean valuation of unobserved attributes, such as the reliability or the design
of the vehicle, for instance. Finally, εijt is the individual-product-specific error term. In
the nested logit model, the (εijt)j=1...J are allowed to be correlated for two vehicles in the
same nest g. This takes into account the correlation in individual preferences for vehicles
belonging to the same nest (family, executives, sports car...).
The nested logit specification, together with the normalization to zero of the mean utility
level of the outside option,11 yields (see, e.g., Rust & Berkovec, 1985)
ln(sdjt)− ln(sd0t) = pjtβd +Xjtγd + fdt (CO2jt) + σ ln(s¯dj/g t) + ξdjt , (1)
where sdjt is the market share of product j and s¯
d
j/g t denotes the intra-segment share of
product j among nest g. σ represents the correlation of consumers' utility across automo-
biles of the same nest and lies between 0 (no correlation) and 1 (perfect correlation). This
equation is very convenient for estimation because it provides a linear relationship between
the market shares and the characteristics of the product. This equation also incorporates
10CO2 emissions and kilometers per euro are related through the formula km/e =
k
CO2 ×pg , where pg
stands for the gasoline price and k depends on the fuel type only (k = 22.866 if the motor uses gasoline,
k = 26.86 if the motor uses diesel).
11The mean utility of the outside option may evolve through time, especially if the feebate policy has
discouraged consumers to purchase cars on the second hand market. This is accounted for by the year
dummies.
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consumers heterogeneity through the dependence in d of βd, γd, fdt and ξ
d
jt. Hereafter we
impose a linear decomposition in d, so that for the price parameter for instance:
βd = β0 + βu1urban + β
a11age∈[40,59] + βa21age≥60 + βi11income∈[22,000;32,000] + βi21income≥32,000.
As usually (see, e.g., Berry et al., 1995, Nevo, 2000, and Nevo, 2001), we suppose that,
except prices, all characteristics are predetermined and uncorrelated with the error term
ξdjt. On the contrary, prices are allowed to be endogenous. This is typically the case if
manufacturers observe the (ξdjt)d,j and take them into account in their pricing strategy.
12
By construction, conditional market shares s¯j/g t are also endogenous, so that at least
two instruments are necessary to identify the demand model. Following the literature
(see, e.g., Berry et al., 1995), our instruments are based on the characteristics of other
products. If firms compete in prices on an oligopolistic market with differentiated products,
they are constrained in their pricing strategy by the existence of close substitutes. The
characteristics of the other products are thus likely to affect all prices, but are not correlated
with the unobserved demand term ξdjt. Following this logic, we rely hereafter on four sets
of instrumental variables. The first is the sums of characteristics of other brands' products.
The second is the sums of characteristics of other brands' products of the same segment.
The third consists of the sums of characteristics of other models of the brand. The last
set is composed by the sums of characteristics of other models of the brand in the same
segment.
3.2 Consumers preferences
We estimate Model (1) as explained above but with slight variations in the way the price
and CO2 affect the model. In Specification (1), price is not instrumented, whereas all
other specifications allow for price endogeneity. Specifications (2) to (4) differ in the way
CO2 emissions are included in the regressions. In Specification (2), the evolution of CO2
preferences are captured through a temporal trend. In Specification (3), CO2 emissions
are interacted with year dummies whereas CO2 emissions are interacted with two periods
(2006-2007 and 2008) dummies in Specification (4). Results are displayed in Table 6. For
the sake of concision, we only present the estimates of σ and (β¯, γ¯), the average of the
preferences parameters (βd, γd)d=1...18 among the population of purchasers. Table 19 in
Appendix B displays the estimates of the preference parameters according to demographic
characteristics.
12Another source of endogeneity is measurement error since, as mentioned before, we observe list prices
rather than transaction prices.
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Price (β¯) −0.026
(0.001)
∗∗ −0.171
(0.012)
∗∗ −0.094
(0.013)
∗∗ −0.109
(0.013)
∗∗
ln(s¯) (σ) 0.279
(0.008)
∗∗ 0.285
(0.009)
∗∗ 0.283
(0.008)
∗∗ 0.284
(0.008)
∗∗
Characteristics (γ¯)
Weight 0.087
(0.006)
∗∗ 0.286
(0.017)
∗∗ 0.181
(0.019)
∗∗ 0.202
(0.019)
∗∗
Horsepower −0.104
(0.004)
∗∗ 0.096
(0.017)
∗∗ −0.014
(0.018)
0.007
(0.018)
Km/e 0.019
(0.002)
∗∗ 0.054
(0.004)
∗∗ 0.034
(0.004)
∗∗ 0.038
(0.004)
∗∗
Cylinder capacity 0.041
(0.002)
∗∗ 0.06
(0.002)
∗∗ 0.051
(0.002)
∗∗ 0.053
(0.003)
∗∗
Station wagon car-body −0.494
(0.012)
∗∗ −0.440
(0.014)
∗∗ −0.467
(0.013)
∗∗ −0.462
(0.013)
∗∗
Coupe/convertible −0.583
(0.017)
∗∗ −0.164
(0.039)
∗∗ −0.39
(0.041)
∗∗ −0.347
(0.042)
∗∗
Three doors −0.436
(0.01)
∗∗ −0.468
(0.011)
∗∗ −0.449
(0.011)
∗∗ −0.452
(0.011)
∗∗
Nb. of observations 100 876 100 876 100 876 100 876
Notes: Column (1): price not instrumented, (2): evolution of CO2 preferences
captured through a temporal trend. (3): CO2 interacted with year dummies. (4):
CO2 interacted with three periods (2003-2005, 2006-2007 and 2008). All specifi-
cations include model and years fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Significance levels: ∗∗ 1%, ∗ 5%, † 10%.
Table 6: Estimates of average preferences for vehicle characteristics.
Before studying the way consumers value CO2, we describe results on their preferences for
standard attributes. When not instrumented, the price coefficient has the correct sign but
is very small, leading to price elasticities between -1 and 0. Horsepower is also significantly
negative in this case. Apart from that, all mean parameters are globally stable from
one specification to another. Weight, fuel economy and cylinder capacity are positively
valuated. On average, households dislike coupe/convertible, station-wagon cars and three-
door vehicles.13 We obtain estimates around 0.3 for σ, reflecting the fact that products
inside segments are moderate substitutes. This result stems from the fact that in our
estimation, we have controlled for model fixed effects. A large part of the correlation on
fixed unobservable characteristics of models in the same segment is thus already taken into
account. Without model fixed effects, we obtain σ̂ ' 0.6.
All the previous estimates correspond to the average parameters of preferences of pur-
chasers. Table 19 in Appendix B shows there is a substantial heterogeneity across them.
Households are in particular less sensitive to price when they live in urban area than in
13Small cars in Europe can have three doors. Such cars correspond to baseline models.
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rural area. The effect of price also decreases with income and age. Hence, unsurprisingly,
the more price-sensitive consumers are the young and poor ones, living in rural areas.
Using these estimates, we compute the price elasticities for each demographic group, using
the fact that in our framework, the price elasticity of product j for group d is equal to
−βdpj(1−σs¯dj/g− (1−σ)sdj )/(1−σ)). Sales-weighted average price elasticities are reported
in Table 7. These elasticities lie between -4.49 and -1.54, the mean being -2.9. These orders
of magnitude are similar to those found in the literature. They are below those of Berry
et al. (1995), who report price elasticities between -6.5 and -3.5 (see their Table 4) but in the
same range as those of Train & Winston (2007), who obtain -2.37 on average. Moreover, as
expected, the most elastic demand comes from young, poor and rural consumers, whereas
the less elastic one arises from rich, old and urban individuals.
Rural area Urban area
Income/Age 18-39 40-59 ≥ 60 18-39 40-59 ≥ 60
0-22,000 −4.49
(0.361)
−3.68
(0.388)
−2.72
(0.362)
−3.93
(0.348)
−3.15
(0.380)
−2.24
(0.352)
22,000-32,000 −4.21
(0.366)
−3.31
(0.384)
−2.39
(0,y365)
−3.82
(0.367)
−2.81
(0.376)
−1.97
(0.362)
≥ 32,000 −3.77
(0.366)
−2.80
(0.38)
−1.93
(0.367)
−3.46
(0.374)
−2.35
(0.376)
−1.54
(0.369)
Notes: the standard errors, in parentheses, are computed by bootstrap.
Table 7: Average price elasticity (sales-weighted) according to demographic characteristics.
Overall, the previous results on consumers' preferences for standard attributes are reassur-
ing and give credit to the model and the estimations. We can thus turn our attention to
the estimates of the valuations of CO2 emissions.
3.3 Evidence of environmental valuation changes
Table 8 displays the estimates of the evolution of CO2 emissions valuation corresponding
to Specifications (1) to (4) considered above.14
14The parameters presented correspond to the average in the population, parameters of heterogeneity
are presented in Table 20 in Appendix B.
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
CO2 emissions −0.904
(0.038)
∗∗ −0.794
(0.042)
∗∗ −0.947
(0.039)
∗∗ −0.947
(0.039)
∗∗
CO2 emissions×Trend −0.067
(0.005)
∗∗ −0.127
(0.007)
∗∗
CO2 emissions×2006 −0.241
(0.026)
∗∗
CO2 emissions×2007 −0.182
(0.03)
∗∗
CO2 emissions×2008 −0.383
(0.022)
∗∗ −0.382
(0.023)
∗∗
CO2 emissions×(2006-2007) −0.234
(0.025)
∗∗
Notes: Column (1): price not instrumented, (2): evolution of CO2 preferences cap-
tured through a temporal trend. (3): CO2 interacted with year dummies. (4): CO2
interacted with three periods (2003-2005, 2006-2007 and 2008). Significance levels:
∗∗ 1%, ∗ 5%, † 10%.
Table 8: Estimates of CO2 emissions valuation (mean parameters)
The negative and significant sign of CO2 emissions captures the idea that consumers have a
preference for low CO2 emitting cars, all things being equal. We also observe a quite clear
pattern on evolutions. All specifications indicate a growing concern on CO2 emissions in
purchases. From 2003-2005 to 2008, our estimates show that the average of the parameter
on CO2 emissions, which is negatively related to consumers' concern on global warming,
has decreased by around 0.38 according to Specifications (3) or (4).
Moreover, while the trend is quite large, Specification (3) indicates that actually, there have
been two main steps in this evolution: a first one in 2006, and a second one in 2008 whereas
2007 resembles much to 2006. Column (4), which summarizes these results, indicates that
both effects have a similar magnitude with a first decrease of -0.234 in the years 2006-2007
compared to the years 2003-2005 and a second decrease of -0.148 (-0.382+0.234) in 2008
compared to the period 2006-2007. Because the compulsory energy label policy took place
at the end of 2005 and the feebate was introduced at the beginning of 2008, this timing
suggests that the shift in preferences is related to the policies introduced during this period.
Up to now, we have estimated preferences for CO2 emissions. It is possible, however,
given that both the energy label and the feebate policies are based on classes of emissions,
that consumers focus on such classes rather than directly on CO2 emissions. This may
especially be true after energy labels became compulsory, as the information was more
easily transmitted through these labels. To assess the plausibility of this interpretation, we
estimate a model similar to Specification (4) above, in which CO2 emissions are replaced
by the classes of emissions.
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Class of emissions Parameter Class of emission Parameter
A ×(2006-2007) 0.168
(0.179)
E+ ×(2006-2007) −0.119
(0.028)
∗∗
A ×(2008) 1.005
(0.15)
∗∗ E+ ×(2008) −0.260
(0.034)
∗∗
B ×(2006-2007) 0.448
(0.033)
∗∗ E- ×(2006-2007) −0.164
(0.020)
∗∗
B ×(2008) 1.106
(0.037)
∗∗ E- ×(2008) −0.156
(0.025)
∗∗
C+ ×(2006-2007) 0.425
(0.03)
∗∗ F ×(2006-2007) −0.108
(0.025)
∗∗
C+ ×(2008) 0.499
(0.035)
∗∗ F ×(2008) −0.125
(0.031)
∗∗
C- ×(2006-2007) −0.029
(0.027)
G ×(2006-2007) 0.015
(0.035)
C- ×(2008) 0.092
(0.031)
∗∗ G ×(2008) 0.201
(0.043)
∗∗
Notes: the parameters are obtained with the same model as in Column (4)
of Table 6, except that we replace CO2 by the class of emissions dummies.
Table 9: Evolution of valuation for classes of emissions (mean parameters)
The results, displayed in Table 9, are in line with those on CO2 emissions. We observe a
sharp evolution of consumers' preferences towards environmentally-friendly goods during
this period. The results are also consistent with the previous interpretation. The raise in
the valuation of low-emitting classes (namely, A to C) contrasts with the fall in the high-
emitting ones (E to F). Only class G, which represents less than 1% of total sales in 2008,
has a profile that does not fit with our other results.15 The raise is especially striking in
2008 for classes A and B. Similarly, the fall for E+ cars is larger in 2008 than in 2006-2007.
For other polluting cars (classes E- and F), the shift appears to be similar in 2006-2007 and
in 2008, suggesting that consumers were more attracted by the rebates than discouraged
by the fees. In the end, the signals given by these policies, first with colorful labels, then
with both labels and prices, seem to have been successful to shift consumers preferences
towards environmentally-friendly cars and to align the preferences of the consumers with
the classes promoted by the French government.
With the previous estimates in hand, we can compute the willingness to pay for a 10g
reduction of CO2 emissions. Because βˆ is the valuation of price in thousands of euros and
γˆ is the valuation of CO2 emissions for 100 grams, this willingness to pay corresponds to
100 times the ratio between the CO2 coefficient and the price coefficient in the demand
model. The average evolution on the whole population is substantial. With Specification
(4) described above, we obtain an average increase of 213 euros in 2006-2007 compared to
2003-2005, and 367 euros in 2008 (all in 2008 euros). This corresponds to an increase in
the willingness to pay of approximately 700 euros for going from the lower threshold of
15The results are consistent with the fact that these cars are luxury goods, with an inelastic demand.
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class C+ (121g per kilometer) to the lower threshold of class B (101g per kilometer), an
amount of the same magnitude as the difference in the rebates between these two classes
(namely, 500 euros).
Even if it is difficult to find an exact benchmark, these amounts are consistent with Brown-
stone et al. (2000), who study preferences for alternative-fuel vehicles using data on Cal-
ifornian households. They find that respondents preferred compressed natural gas and
methanol to gasoline and that they were ready to pay around $500-600 to reduce CO2
emissions by 10%.16 Our results are also in line with the results of the MIT Survey of
Public Attitudes on Energy and the Environment, which shows that almost three-quarters
of the respondents felt the government should do more to deal with global warming and
that they were ready to pay $7 more per month to mitigate it in 2006 compared to 2003.
If we posit an annual discount rate of 10% and a replacement of new cars by consumers
every ten years, we obtain an increase in the willingness to pay of around $600, broadly
consistent with our estimates.
This overall shift mixes however important differences among consumers (see Table 10).
While the willingness to pay has increased in 2008 by only 211 euros for old and poor
people living in rural area, this increase reaches 675 euros for old and rich people living in
urban areas. The income effect is non-ambiguous on the willingness to pay because it has
both a positive impact on preferences and a negative one on price elasticity. Rich people
have thus higher willingness to pay than others and this effect is particularly important
in 2008. The effect of age, on the other hand, is more complicated. Young consumers
have higher preferences for environment but high price elasticities whereas old ones do
not strongly care about global warming but have small price elasticities. In 2006-2007,
the effect of environmental preferences dominates the price elasticities and young people
usually have a higher willingness to pay to reduce global warming than their elder. The
situation is more contrasted in 2008.
16Few other papers have studied the automobile market but do not give precise estimate of the willingness
to pay for the reduction of global warming. Potoglou & Kanaroglou (2007) analyse the factors of adoption
of cleaner vehicles, and find that beyond price reductions, low emissions have an impact per se. Kishi &
Satoh (2005) also explore the incentives to buy a low CO2-emitting car in Japan.
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Rural area Urban area
Income Age 18-39 40-59 ≥ 60 18-39 40-59 ≥ 60
0-22,000
2006-07 205
(25)
176
(30)
131
(39)
204
(27)
171
(35)
117
(46)
2008 249
(41)
203
(49)
211
(62)
268
(44)
224
(56)
239
(74)
22,000-32,000
2006-07 230
(26)
206
(32)
162
(43)
231
(28)
205
(35)
152
(50)
2008 322
(48)
298
(58)
335
(83)
351
(50)
335
(65)
391
(101)
≥ 32,000 2006-07 289(32) 285(42) 260(65) 297(34) 298(49) 272(88)
2008 427
(62)
442
(86)
544
(145)
472
(67)
514
(105)
675
(226)
Notes: we compute the evolution between the willingness to pay for a 10g reduction
of CO2 emissions between 2003-2005 and 2006-2007 or 2008 (in 2008 e). Standard
errors are computed by bootstrap.
Table 10: Evolution of the willingness to pay for a 10g reduction of CO2 emissions
These results are consistent with a governmental French report on environmental con-
sciousness between 1995 and 2011.17 This report highlights an increase in environmental
concerns over the period, 46.1% of French people being sensitive to environment against
35% in 2002. It also concludes that rich consumers are more willing to pay to fight against
the environmental degradation.
To assess the credibility of the differences we estimate between demographic groups, we
also relate the willingness to pay to the general environmental preoccupation using data on
electoral vote at the town level. An estimate of the average willingness to pay of the town
is computed and regressed on the rate of electoral votes for different parties.18 We use the
electoral votes during the first ballot of 2007 presidential elections, and look in particular
at the relationship between the average willingness to pay and votes for the green party.
The rate of green voters is considered to be the number of votes in favor of Dominique
Voynet, the candidate of the green party, divided by the total number of valid votes. For
the sake of clarity, we gather together here the extreme left parties (namely, Besancenot,
Bové, Buffet, Laguiller and Schivardi) and the extreme right parties (Le Pen, Nihous and
De Villiers), but results are similar when considering each of them separately.
It is reassuring to find a very high correlation between the votes for the green party and
the willingness to pay for environment. As expected, the voters of the green party are
17See Commissariat général au développement durable : Les perceptions sociales et
pratiques environnementales des Français de 1995 à 2011, http://www.developpement-
durable.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Revue_CGDD_octobre_2011.pdf
18The voting results were obtained through publicly available data from the French home affairs minister.
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those who care the most about CO2 emissions. It also does not come as a surprise that
both extreme left and right voters do not pay much attention to these issues. In the middle
of the political chessboard, our results are in line with the idea that rich people, who are
more likely to vote for the right party, have higher willingness to pay for environment.
2006-07 2008
Constant 252.46
(3.49)
∗∗ 439.66
(7.50)
∗∗
Voynet (Green politics) 508.56
(21.9)
∗∗ 1037.3
(47.22
∗∗
Extreme left −175.66
(6.77)
∗∗ −422.06
(14.56)
∗∗
Royal (left) −111.86
(5.05)
∗∗ −216.47
(10.85)
∗∗
Bayrou (center) Reference
Sarkozy (right) 25.30
(5.00)
∗∗ 46.79
(10.77)
∗∗
Extreme right −129.88
(4.72)
∗∗ −307.64
(10.16)
∗∗
Nb. obs 31,373
Notes: we regress the evolution in the willingness to pay
on results of the presidential elections, at a municipal
level.
Table 11: Link between the evolution of average willingness to pay and political preferences
at the town level
Overall, these results suggest that environmental policies may impact consumers' utility
and increase their preference for environmentally-friendly cars. However, it seems difficult,
given our data, to identify exactly the channel through which they modify consumers
preferences. A first channel would be the signalling effect mentioned earlier. In particular,
the existence of the feebate signal to consumers how important it is to choose low CO2
emitting vehicles. Such a shift may also be due to the informational value of the energy
label, which would make it easier for the consumers to compare different vehicles in terms of
CO2 emissions. Finally, these policies may have also affected the manufacturers marketing
strategy, more advertising being put on low-emitting vehicles after the introduction of the
policies.
3.4 Importance of preference changes
While our estimates suggest that preferences evolve over time, we now measure the im-
portance of the evolutions. For that purpose, we compute, using the structural parameter
estimates, what would have been the evolution of the average CO2 emissions of new vehicles
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without any evolution in environmental preferences. More precisely, we compute counter-
factual market shares and the average CO2 emissions of new vehicles by dropping from the
utilities the interactions between CO2 emissions and the time dummies (2006-2007) and
2008. The results are displayed in Table 12.19
Year Observed Predicted
2003 152.8 152.8
2004 151.4 151.4
2005 150.5 150.5
2006 146.9 149.6
(0.349)
2007 146.6 149.1
(0.321)
2008 137.0 140.3
(0.242)
Notes: for predicted values, the stan-
dard errors are computed by bootstrap.
Table 12: Evolution of average CO2 emissions with and without the variation in the envi-
ronmental preferences.
Without any shift, we would have observed average CO2 emissions around 140.3g per
kilometer instead of 137g at the end of 2008. Put it another way, the shift in preferences
explain 20% (3.3g of the total 15.8g decrease) of the decrease observed between 2003 and
2008. 75% (2.5g) of this shift are due to the energy label policy, measured by the difference
between observed and predicted CO2 in 2007. The 25% left (0.8g) is due to non-price effects
of the feebate system.
Manufacturers effects (i.e., improvements in the fuel efficiency of vehicles and a marketing
of more low-emitting cars), excluding the price effect resulting from the feebate, explains
around 29% of the overall decrease of 15.8g. Predicted values shows indeed that without
any shift in preferences in 2006-2007, the annual decrease in average CO2 emissions between
2003 and 2007 is (152.8− 149.1)/4 ' 0.93g. If we extrapolate the same trend on 2008 and
thus neglect, in line with what is suggested by Figure 3, any reaction of manufacturers to
the feebate in 2008, we obtain a total decrease due to manufacturers of 4.7g between 2003
and 2008, corresponding to 29%. Finally, the rest, i.e. 51%, can be attributed to the price
19The observed average CO2 emissions displayed in the table do not match those of Figure 2 for two
reasons. First, and as discussed previously, the sample excludes December and January. Second, to remain
consistent with the rest of the econometric analysis, we use the CO2 emissions of the cheapest version of
each product. In general these versions are the lowest CO2-emitting cars within a given product, resulting
in smaller average emissions than in Figure 2.
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effect resulting from the feebate. If this effect is the largest one, non-price effects appear
to be quite substantial.
4 Conclusion
We have shown evidence that, in the French automobile market, consumers shifted their
preferences for CO2 emissions between 2003 and 2008. This shift seems to be related to two
environmental policies that were implemented during this period, namely the obligation of
indicating energy labels by the end of 2005 and the introduction of a feebate system in 2008.
The shift is substantial, as the willingness to pay for a reduction of 10g of CO2 emissions
has increased by 367 euros on average between 2003-2005 and 2008. This amount is more
than the rebate offered to buy a car emitting between 121g/km and 130g/km. Without
any change in the preferences, we also find that the reduction of average CO2 emissions
over the period would have been 20% smaller.
Our analysis suggests that the shift in preferences is related to environmental concerns.
It is in line with the idea that public policies may not only change the incentives given
to consumers, but also their preferences. Changes in consumers' preferences should be
interpreted here in a broad sense, including informational or peer effects. Our analysis also
shows that preferences may evolve across time. Not taking this evolution into account may
thus lead to erroneous conclusions and biased predictions. The estimation of demand using
structural models traditionally rely on the assumption that parameters of preferences are
constant across time. Our paper suggests that caution should thus be taken when a large
time series is considered or when public policies have been introduced during the period.
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A Details on data
A.1 Market definition
We define a market as the set of households sharing the same demographic characteristics
on a given year. To exclude the effects of the anticipation of the feebate policy in December
2007 and post-anticipation effects in January 2008, we only consider, within a given year,
the sales from February to November. Note that there is a trade-off in the choice of
demographic groups between being realistic, which pushes for a large number of groups,
and reducing statistical bias stemming from observed market shares equal to zero. When
the number of groups is large, many observed market shares are equal to zero and are not
used in the estimation because we take the logarithm of market shares. This results in
general in a selection bias. This is why we choose a moderate number of groups, namely
18, corresponding to three age classes (18-39, 40-59 and 60 and more), two geographical
areas (cities of less than 20,000 inhabitants, called rural areas and the others, called urban
areas) and three income classes (0-22,000, 22,000-32,000 and more than 32,000). The value
of 22,000 euros corresponds to the fiscal income of a two-person household paid at the
minimum wage. The purchaser's income is not observed directly in our dataset, and we
approximate it using the median income of his age class in his town, using publicly available
data from the national institute of statistics and economic analysis (INSEE). When age is
missing or town too small the median income of the whole population is attributed since
the median income by age class is only available for cities of more than 10,000 inhabitants.
Demographics Frequency
Rural area 41.7%
Urban area 58.3%
Age ∈ 18-39 25.8%
Age ∈ 40-59 40.4%
Age ∈ 60-100 33.9%
Income < 22,000e 21.5%
Income ∈ 22,000-32,000 50.8%
Income > 32,000e 27.8%
Table 13: Frequency of demographic characteristics among purchasers
The computation of market shares sdj involves computing the number of households sharing
characteristics d. Similarly to Berry et al. (1995), we suppose that the income distribution
is log-normal within each group d. We then estimate the parameters of this log-normal
distribution using the quantiles of the distribution stemming from INSEE data. Finally,
using the log-normal form, the probability to belong to each income class is estimated
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in order to recover the number of households. The share of the outside option is variable
across markets (see Table 14), reflecting heterogeneity in consumers' preferences across our
demographic groups.
Rural area Urban area
Income/Age 18-39 40-59 ≥ 60 18-39 40-59 ≥ 60
0-22,000 99.0% 99.0% 99.2% 98.2% 99.6% 99.3%
22 000-32 000 93.9% 93.5% 92.3% 94.9% 92.7% 92.4%
≥ 32,000 97.3% 97.9% 96.9% 98.1% 97.2% 97.5%
Table 14: Share of the outside good in 2008 according to the group of consumers
A.2 Definition of the products
As usually in this literature, we define a product by a set of characteristics. In choosing
this set of characteristics, we face a similar trade-off as previously. A rather large set is
necessary to avoid aggregating too different products, but defining products too precisely
increases the number of zero market shares, raising the sample selection issue mentioned
above. We define a product by its brand, model, car-body style, type of fuel, CO2 emissions
class and number of doors. We do not use horsepower and weight in this definition to
keep the number of zeros moderate. On the other hand, we can still introduce them in
utility functions by considering their value for the base model, i.e. the cheapest vehicle
within the same product. Table 15 represents the number of products and the number of
zeros obtained with our product definition. The number of products increases over time,
reflecting the differentiation strategy of manufacturers. As a consequence, the average
number of null market shares also increases across time. A maximum of 821 zeros is
observed in 2008 for young purchasers with a low income and living in a rural area.
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Number of products 1163 1249 1307 1374 1438 1522
Number of zeros
Mean 332 359 365 428 449 516
Minimum 150 174 175 225 228 243
Maximum 505 513 559 649 722 821
Table 15: Number of products and number of zeros per market
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A.3 Segmentation of the automobile market
The nested logit approach requires to define a segmentation of the market in homogenous
groups of products. Our segmentation, based on the main use of the vehicle, is close to the
one of The European New Car Assessment Program one (Euro NCAP). Table 16 displays
the 8 segments we consider and their market shares in 2007 and 2008. Note in particular
that sport cars include all convertible cars as well as vehicles with a high horsepower/weight
ratio, while small multi-purpose vehicles (MPV) include small vans such as the Renault
Kangoo. The entire classification is presented in Table 17.
2007 2008
Number Freq. Number Freq.
Urban 310 228 44.3% 390 557 53.4%
Small Family 109 211 15.6% 115 011 15.7%
Large Family 50 841 7.3% 46 749 6.4%
Executive 6 919 1.0% 4 394 0.6%
Sports 47 877 6.8% 31 648 3.8%
Small MPV 130 068 18.6% 113 732 15.6%
Large MPV 6 393 0.9% 3 216 0.4%
Allroad/SUV 38 286 5.5% 26 046 3.6%
Table 16: Frequency of purchase per segment, in 2007 and 2008
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B Additional tables and figures
B.1 Evolution of market shares
5
10
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Class B market shares
Class E market shares
Linear trends (with breaks)
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energy labels
Figure 6: Evolution of market shares for classes B and E
Estimates
Parameters Class B Class E
Intercept 12.7∗∗
(0.576)
24.7∗∗
(0.527)
Time trend −0.02
(0.019)
−0.06∗∗
(0.015)
Dummy of being after 11/2005 3.30∗∗
(0.87)
−0.82
(0.614)
Additional trend after 11/2005 0.21∗∗
(0.044)
−0.13∗∗
(0.033)
Dummy of being after 01/2008 10.1∗∗
(1.46)
−6.0∗∗
(0.673)
Additional trend after 01/2008 0.94∗∗
(0.206)
0.07
(0.067)
Notes: monthly effects are included. December 2007 and Jan-
uary 2008 are dropped because of anticipation effects. Standard er-
rors are heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation robust. Significance levels:
∗∗ 1%, ∗ 5%, † 10%.
Table 18: Regression of market shares of classes B and E on time
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B.2 Further results on the nested logit model
As Tables 19 and 20 show, we observe a substantial heterogeneity across the groups of
households we consider. Purchasers living in large agglomerations value less fuel efficiency
and station-wagon cars than consumers in rural areas. This is probably related to the fact
that people drive less in urban areas and it is more convenient to have a smaller vehicle in
large cities. Older people value less weight and station-wagon cars, which may stem from
the fact that older people live on average in smaller households, so that they do not value
much these attributes (these attributes being very good proxies for size). They also value
less convertible and three-door vehicles, probably because they care more about comfort.
Finally, as may be expected, they hardly value horsepower. Rich people also value less
horsepower, convertible and three-door vehicles. The results also indicate that both the
price and the cost per kilometer are less an issue for this population.
Base Urban Age∈[40;59] Age≥ 60 Medium income High income
Price −0.175
(0.014)
∗∗ 0.015
(0.004)
∗∗ 0.042
(0.004)
∗∗ 0.070
(0.004)
∗∗ 0.014
(0.005)
∗∗ 0.034
(0.005)
∗∗
Weight 0.283
(0.022)
∗∗ −0.036
(0.008)
∗∗ −0.025
(0.009)
∗∗ −0.134
(0.009)
∗∗ 0.003
(0.010)
−0.021
(0.010)
∗
Horsepower 0.174
(0.022)
∗∗ −0.007
(0.011)
−0.133
(0.012)
∗∗ −0.232
(0.013)
∗∗ −0.029
(0.014)
∗ −0.058
(0.014)
∗∗
Km/e 0.111
(0.005)
∗∗ −0.046
(0.003)
∗∗ −0.023
(0.004)
∗∗ −0.090
(0.004)
∗∗ 0.001
(0.004)
−0.025
(0.004)
∗∗
Cylinder capacity 0.059
(0.004)
∗∗ −0.008
(0.003)
∗∗ −0.002
(0.004)
0.013
(0.004)
∗∗ −0.004
(0.004)
−0.012
(0.004)
∗∗
Station-wagon −0.415
(0.022)
∗∗ −0.060
(0.015)
∗∗ −0.006
(0.018)
−0.085
(0.019)
∗∗ 0.014
(0.019)
0.043
(0.019)
∗
Convertible 0.114
(0.051)
∗ 0.0130
(0.027)
−0.283
(0.032)
∗∗ −0.895
(0.033)
∗∗ −0.060
(0.033)
† −0.075
(0.034)
∗
3 doors −0.190
(0.020)
∗∗ −0.006
(0.016)
−0.131
(0.019)
∗∗ −0.472
(0.020)
∗∗ −0.048
(0.019)
∗ −0.079
(0.020)
∗∗
Notes: the base parameters correspond to the parameters for the reference group, namely young
people with low income in rural areas.
Table 19: Decomposition of preference parameters according to demographic characteris-
tics, for Specification (4)
Environmental preferences are heterogeneous, as Table 20 shows. Preference for environmentally-
friendly vehicles is higher for young and old purchasers while there is no significant effect
of the income. Environmental quality is clearly more valuated in urban areas than in rural
towns. The evolution of preferences is also stronger for medium and high income house-
holds. Finally, there is a clear negative effect of age on the change of preferences, the group
of young purchasers increasing more their valuation than the others in 2006-2007 and 2008.
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Base Urban Age∈[40;59] Age≥ 60 Medium income High income
CO2 emissions −0.844
(0.084)
∗∗ −0.378
(0.063)
∗∗ 0.250
(0.074)
∗∗ 0.030
(0.076)
−0.013
(0.078)
0.045
(0.079)
CO2 ×(2006-2007) −0.359
(0.045)
∗∗ 0.032
(0.031)
0.126
(0.039)
∗∗ 0.221
(0.039)
∗∗ −0.011
(0.039)
−0.049
(0.040)
CO2 ×2008 −0.436
(0.057)
∗∗ 0.006
(0.042)
0.166
(0.051)
∗∗ 0.213
(0.053)
∗∗ −0.084
(0.054)
−0.168
(0.055)
∗∗
Notes: the base parameters correspond to the parameters for the reference group, namely young
people with low income in rural areas.
Table 20: Decomposition of environmental preferences according to demographic charac-
teristics, for Specification (4)
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